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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS: PAST FAILURES,
PRESENT SOLUTIONS

MORSE TAN*

ABSTRACT
North Korea has recently announced that it has developed nuclear
weapons and has pulled out of the six-party talks. These events do not emerge
out of a vacuum, and this Article lends perspective through an
interdisciplinary lens that seeks to grapple with the complexities and provide
constructive approaches based on this well-researched understanding. This
Article analyzes political, military, historical, legal and other angles of this
international crisis.
Past dealings with North Korea have been unfruitful because other nations
do not recognize the ties between North Korean acts and its ideology and
objectives. For a satisfactory resolution to the current crisis, South Korea and
the United States must maintain sufficient deterrence, focus on multi-lateral
and international avenues, and increase the negative and later positive
incentives for North Korean compliance with its international obligations.
From an international legal and international organizations perspective,
the multilateral talks can be bolstered by inclusion of the U.N. Secretary
General as a proactive mediator. The Secretary General can call for, if
necessary and after the failure of other means, U.N. Security Council action
and the reinstitution of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to do
its duly constituted work of preventing proliferation. If these approaches
succeed, the peninsula, region, and world will become better places.

* Morse Tan, Senior Research Fellow, the University of Texas School of Law. Thanks to faculty
members of the University of Texas (Profs. Karen Engle, Derek Jinks, and Larry Sager),
Pepperdine Catholic, and Texas Southern for their comments and questions during presentations
of these materials. Thanks as well to Dr. Jeff Todd, Anna Sabayrac, Jeff Heiderscheit, and
Jessica Ho. My gratitude also to the students in my International Organizations class, in which
we contemplated the North Korean situation as a case study. Finally, thanks to Assistant
Secretary of State Christopher Hill for his interest in this article and his efforts to resolve the reallife crisis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nuclear physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann changed the course of
history through the small but stupendous act of splitting a uranium atom.1 The
devastating power of an atomic bomb itself came about through the efforts of
American nuclear scientists through the Manhattan Project.2 A particular
isotope of uranium, U235, accounts for nuclear possibilities.3 This atom, when
hit by a neutron, emits one or more neutrons along with energy as it breaks
apart into two pieces. This process is known as fission.4 A successive chain
reaction can take place under the proper parameters.5 When one controls this
chain reaction so that the rate of fission remains constant, nuclear energy
results.6
Many nations, including North Korea, make use of nuclear fission to
generate electricity.7 In 1993, contrary to the terms of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), which it had signed, North Korea refused to allow
inspections of one of its nuclear facilities, which the United States, Japan, and
South Korea suspected of processing nuclear materials for weapons.8 For the
next eighteen months, North Korea played a game of nuclear brinkmanship—
keeping inspectors at arm’s length, threatening to withdraw totally from the
NPT, agreeing to and withdrawing from talks, and increasing the vehemence of
its propaganda to threaten war in the face of proposed sanctions—to try to
secure more economic aid and political leverage against the United States.9 B.
K. Gills writes that the nuclear crisis was on a “trajectory toward war” until
Jimmy Carter, of his own accord, brokered a deal that removed the sanction
threat if North Korea agreed to inspections, thus averting the crisis.10
Ten years later, however, not only has North Korea violated its pledge not
to develop nuclear weapons, it has brazenly declared to the world that it

1. HARALAMBOS ATHANASOPULOS, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(2000).
2. Id.; Geoffrey P. Hammond, Nuclear Energy into the Twenty-first Century, 54 APPLIED
ENERGY 327, 328 (1996).
3. Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation
Regime To Impede Advanced Proliferation, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 71, 77 (1995).
4. Id. at 77–78.
5. Id. at 78.
6. Id. at 77–78.
7. B. K. GILLS, KOREA VERSUS KOREA: A CASE OF CONTESTED LEGITIMACY 235–36
(Michale Liefer, ed., 1996); see also Hammond, supra note 2.
8. GILLS, supra note 7, at 236.
9. Id. at 236–39.
10. Id. at 240–43; William M. Drennan, Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s
Coercing Whom?, in THE UNITED STATES AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 157, 159 (Robert J. Art &
Patrick M. Cronin eds., 2003).
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already possesses such weapons.11 Analysts attribute North Korea’s desire for
weapons to several factors, such as deterrence against a perceived Western
threat,12 a bargaining chip to gain political and economic advantages,13 or as a
natural extension of the national ideology.14 No matter the reason, atomic
weapons in the hands of a nation with a stated goal to reunite the Korean
Peninsula by force, a nation that has violated all of its major international
agreements, a nation with missile systems capable of reaching South Korea,
Japan, and possibly even the United States, are greatly opposed by these
nations.15
This situation is worsened by North Korea’s refusal to engage in multination talks that include South Korea, the United States, and Japan, plus North
Korea’s own traditional allies China and Russia.16 Many analysts view these
talks as the best prospect for lasting solutions.17 Instead, North Korea wants to
bypass South Korea, the nation with the most at stake, and deal with the United
States directly.18 Although the United States currently opposes bilateral talks,
an effective strategy to address the complexities of the current crisis has yet to
emerge.19
For the past fifty years, North Korea has lied, broken its word, and pushed
tensions to the brink of war, and negotiations with this country have routinely
been unproductive, if not outright failures.20 With nuclear weapons in the
equation, though, the need for effective solutions has never been greater. At
the same time, one scholar has called nuclear diplomacy with North Korea “a
dead-end street.”21 With these risks in the background, this Paper presents the
history of North Korean relations with other countries, explores current actions

11. See Michael Duffy, What Does North Korea Want?, TIME, Feb. 21, 2005, at 23
(reporting that “[d]ays before his 63rd birthday,” Kim Jong-Il’s government announced that, “as
has long been suspected by U.S. intelligence, North Korea has indeed built nuclear weapons ‘for
self-defense’”); Timeline: N. Korea Nuclear Dispute, CNN.COM, Sept. 28, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/02/10/nkorea.timeline/ [hereinafter Timeline]; Paul
Kerr,
North
Korea
Chronology,
ARMS
CONTROL
TODAY,
June
2003,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/nkoreachron_june03.asp.
12. See, e.g., DANIEL A. PINKSTON ET AL., CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES,
MONTEREY INST. OF INT’L STUDIES, SPECIAL REPORT ON THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS STATEMENT (2005), available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050211.htm.
13. North Korea’s Threat, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2005, at A18.
14. See Sung-Yoon Lee, Global Pressure Point: Nuclear Diplomacy vis-à-vis the DPRK: A
Dead-End Street, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 151, 155–58 (2003).
15. See, e.g., PINKSTON ET AL., supra note 12.
16. Id.; North Korea’s Threat, supra note 13.
17. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 14, at 158, 160–65; North Korea’s Threat, supra note 13.
18. See North Korea’s Threat, supra note 13.
19. Id.
20. See Lee, supra note 14, at 155–57.
21. Id. at 152.
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and international responses, and offers solutions, with a focus on the
application of international legal instruments and organizations.
II. BACKGROUND: KOREA DIVIDED AND NORTH KOREA AS ROGUE STATE
A.

History of the Division
1.

Korean Conflict

After finding itself no longer under the ignominy of the Japanese colonial
period (which lasted from 1905 to the end of World War II),22 Korea moved
into a different sort of problem. The Soviet Union, after a period of relative
inaction, decided to actively pursue military efforts at the end of World War II
in order to strengthen its hand during post-war settlements.23 The Soviets
poured south into Manchuria.24 The resulting U.S.–Soviet agreement, contrary
to the will of the Korean people, split this small peninsula into the U.S.-aligned
South Korea and the Soviet-aligned North Korea, with the Soviets agreeing to
push no further south than the 38th parallel.25
Border skirmishes ensued over the next few years until, on the early
morning of June 25th, 1950, North Korean forces embarked on a full-scale war
by launching out over the 38th parallel.26 Premier Kim Il Sung had eight full
divisions (135,000 troops) at his disposal; many of these soldiers fought
previously in World War II.27 By contrast, South Korea counted only 95,000
generally less-seasoned soldiers.28
The North Korean divisions drove deep into South Korea, overmatching
the smaller South Korean forces, who were pushed down to the Pusan
Perimeter, a relatively small swath of land at the southernmost tip of the

22. See MAX HASTINGS, THE KOREAN WAR 25–26 (1987); see also Michael Hickey, The
Korean War: An Overview, BBC ONLINE, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/coldwar/
korea_hickey_01.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2005); HENRY CHUNG, KOREA AND THE UNITED
STATES THROUGH WAR AND PEACE 43–85 (2000).
23. ROBERT J. MYERS, KOREA IN THE CROSS CURRENTS 78–79 (2001); CHUNG, supra note
22, at 97–108.
24. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 103–05; MYERS, supra note 23, at 78.
25. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 109–24; MYERS, supra note 23, at 78–79; M.P. SRIVASTAVA,
THE KOREAN CONFLICT: SEARCH FOR UNIFICATION 23–33 (1982).
26. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 155; BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA’S PLACE IN THE SUN: A
MODERN HISTORY 260 (1997).
27. UNITED STATES ARMY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MILITARY HISTORY, AMERICAN
MILITARY HISTORY 545 (1973).
28. Id. at 546.
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peninsula.29 The North Korean troops made full use of their advantages of
surprise and initiative.30
As the North steamrolled the South, the United States called upon the U.N.
Security Council to take action against North Korean aggression.31 The
Security Council, with the approbation of support of forty-four out of fortynine U.N. member states, called upon its members to send military and other
assistance: sixteen states sent soldiers and twenty-five total countries provided
materials and other assistance.32 General Douglas MacArthur stepped forward
as the U.N. commander of the combined forces.33
MacArthur lead a key counter-initiative known as the Inchon Landing, a
tricky military maneuver due to the tides.34 By the middle of September 1950,
MacArthur’s forces not only plowed back to the 38th parallel, they continued
on north.35 As the U.N. forces proceeded closer to the North Korean–Chinese
border, Chinese soldiers poured into North Korea, driving the U.N. forces
back.36 After two more pushes, one northward by the U.N. troops and one
southward by the Chinese, the battle lines hardened for two more years back
where they started—the 38th parallel.37
2.

Armistice Agreement

With a military draw by mid-1951, the two sides negotiated for the next
two years, resulting in the Korean Armistice Agreement (“Armistice
Agreement”), signed on July 27, 1953.38 The head of the North Korean
military and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.N. Command signed this
Armistice Agreement.39

29. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 169.
30. But see CUMINGS, supra note 26, at 261–63. South Korean intelligence expected an
attack on the Ongjin peninsula, which was repulsed—the surprise may have been that the attack
continued and was more widespread than the Ongjin peninsula. See id.
31. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 158–59; SRIVASTAVA, supra note 25, at 37–45.
32. Hickey, supra note 22; CHUNG, supra note 22, at 160–62; CHI YOUNG PAK, KOREA AND
THE UNITED NATIONS 78 (2000).
33. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 165–66.
34. Id. at 170–77.
35. CUMINGS, supra note 26, at 275–78.
36. See Hickey, supra note 22; CUMINGS, supra note 26, at 284–86.
37. See Hickey, supra note 22; CUMINGS, supra note 26, at 289.
38. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 300–02. Note that South Korea had no desire to sign an
armistice and had to be persuaded to sign by President Eisenhower, largely through repeated
assurances that the United States was committed to unifying Korea. Id. at 290, 296–98.
39. See MYERS, supra note 23, at 93. The Armistice Agreement is a purely military
document with no national signatories.
Military Armistice in Korea and Temporary
Supplementary Agreement, U.S.–N. Korea–P.R.C., July 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 235 [hereinafter
Armistice Agreement].
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While this Armistice Agreement called for a cease-fire, it was not a peace
The Armistice Agreement established the military line of
treaty.40
demarcation, and the demilitarized zone (DMZ).41 The Military Armistice
Commission oversees this agreement.42
The Armistice Agreement, intended as a temporary measure by its own
terms, was supposed to be replaced by a peace treaty through a conference
convening within three months after the Armistice Agreement.43 While a
treaty emerging from the conference was supposed to settle the remaining
issues, such as withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea and a new peace for
the Land of the Morning Calm, this anticipated peace treaty did not come
about as planned. Due to this failure, the two Koreas instead signed the
Agreement of Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and
Cooperation between North and South towards the end of 1991, and the Joint
Declaration by South and North Korea of the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula in 1992.44
B.

North Korea as Rogue State45
1.

History of Hostile Actions

Notwithstanding the Armistice, the U.S. Congressional Research Service
has documented some 124 provocations by North Korea against the United
States, South Korea, and/or Japan from June 1950 to March 2003.46 They have
ranged from multiple assassination attempts on South Korean presidents,47 to

40. Cecilia Y. Oh, Comment, The Effect of Reunification of North and South Korea on
Treaty Status, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2002).
41. Id.
42. Armistice Agreement, supra note 39, at art. II(A)–(B).
43. See id. at art. IV; CHUNG, supra note 22, at 300.
44. See Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation
Between the South and the North, available at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31012.htm
(entered into force Feb. 19, 1992); Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, N. Korea–S. Korea, Jan. 20, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 569, available at http://www.state.gov/
t/ac/rls/or/2004/31011.htm.
45. “Rogue state” is the actual designation that the Clinton administration placed on the
North Korean regime. Analysis: The New Boogeymen, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Dec. 12, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/1376425.stm.
46. DICK K. NANTO, REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
NORTH KOREA: CHRONOLOGY OF PROVOCATIONS, 1950–2003 (2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30004.pdf. See generally THE INST. FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES,
FOREIGN POLICY FOR PEACE AND UNIFICATION (1975) (tracking the South Korean–Japanese
relationship during the early 1970s); KOREAN UNIFICATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (C.I.
Eugene Kim ed., 1973).
47. NANTO, supra note 46, at 8–9. One assassination plot succeeded in killing the wife of
President Park Chung-hee only two days before the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo. Id. at 6; see
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the infiltration of thousands of armed agents involved in kidnapping and
terrorism,48 from the mid-air bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707
passenger plane in 198749 to the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo, a surveillance
ship.50
There have been various air and naval encounters over the years. In April
1969, North Korean MiG jet fighters destroyed a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance
plane over the Sea of Japan, taking thirty-one lives.51 This unarmed plane was
flying about ninety miles off the North Korean coast.52 As recently as March
2003, four North Korean fighters intercepted an American Air Force
reconnaissance plane in international airspace above the Sea of Japan.53 “The
North Korean Navy has captured and detained numerous South Korean
merchant ships that have entered North Korea’s territorial sea.”54
2.

Military Sales

North Korea has aggressively exported ballistic missile technology during
the course of several decades.55 North Korea has sold this technology to
countries such as Libya,56 Pakistan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, and the United Arab
Emirates,57 grossing hundreds of millions of dollars per year, its largest source
also ROBERT S. LITWAK, ROGUE STATES AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONTAINMENT AFTER THE
COLD WAR 202 (2000).
48. “From 1954 to 1992, North Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of 3,693 armed
agents into South Korea . . . .” NANTO, supra note 46, at Summary. See Richard P. Cronin, The
North Korean Nuclear Threat and the U.S.–Japan Security Alliance: Perceived Interests,
Approaches, and Prospects, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 51, 52 (2005), for more on the
kidnapping of Japanese nationals by North Korea.
49. NANTO, supra note 46, at 10. The plane was traveling from Baghdad to Seoul. Twenty
crew members and ninety-five passengers died. This egregious act sought to discourage
participation in the Seoul Olympics. Id.
50. Id. at 4. The North Koreans held the crew of eighty-three prisoners for eleven months.
Id.; see also LITWAK, supra note 47, at 202.
51. NANTO, supra note 46, at 5.
52. Id.; see also LITWAK, supra note 47, at 202.
53. NANTO, supra note 46, at 25.
54. Stephen Kong, Comment, The Right of Innocent Passage: A Case Study on Two Koreas,
11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 373, 375–76 (2002).
55. See JOSEPH S. BERMUDEZ, JR., MONTEREY INST. OF INT’L STUDIES, CTR. FOR
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, A HISTORY OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT IN THE DPRK
18–19 (1999), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/op2.pdf.
56. Libya recently relinquished tons of uranium likely supplied to it by North Korea. See
William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, After Ending Arms Program, Libya Receives a Surprise,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A6.
57. BERMUDEZ, supra note 55, at 1. According to the U.S. Weapons Inspector David Kay,
in an interesting twist of events, Kim Jong-Il defrauded Saddam Hussein out of $10 million in a
deal that Kim failed to fulfill. The contract included ballistic missile technology and other
verboten missile equipment before the Second Gulf War. Bob Drogin, Botched Iraqi Arms Deal
Is Detailed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2003, at A1.
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of hard currency.58 North Korea’s financial stake in the development and sale
of missile technology drives its economy.59
In October of 2002, North Korea threatened to resume long-range missile
tests and a higher level of weapons proliferation to other countries.60 This
activity falls in line with the intermediate range ballistic missiles supplied to
Pakistan in the 1990s.61 It is thought that in the late 1990s North Korea
furnished Pakistan with twelve to twenty-five complete No-Dong medium
range missiles.62 Ominously, North Korea gained from Pakistan uranium
enrichment technology, which it can use (and may have already used) for
producing nuclear weapons.63
Such proliferation efforts have continued. For example, a North Korean
vessel transported Scud missiles to Yemen in December of 2002.64 A
spokesman for the Nigerian government indicated that a North Korean
delegation showed the Nigerian government a catalogue of weapons—but that
Nigeria had not made a definite commitment to purchase them yet.65
3.

Biological and Chemical Weapons in North Korea

North Korea joined the Biological Weapons Convention, an international
treaty that for the most part does not even permit possession of biological
weapons.66 However, it appears that North Korea has developed biological
weapons such as anthrax, yellow fever, and the plague.67

58. See Andrew Ward, Trade Ties Grow Between the Two Koreas, FIN. TIMES (London),
Dec. 10, 2003, at 2; see also Douglas Frantz, N. Korea’s Nuclear Success Is Doubted, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A1.
59. See, e.g., Bertil Lintner, North Korea’s Missile Trade Helps Fund Its Nuclear Program,
YALEGLOBAL ONLINE, May 5, 2003, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1546.
60. See LARRY A. NIKSCH, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRAM 2 (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB91141.pdf.
61. See id. at 1.
62. BERMUDEZ, supra note 55, at 24.
63. See Nuclear Duplicity from Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002, at A20.
64. Lintner, supra note 59.
65. Editorial, Missiles for Sale: North Korea Spreading Weapons Technology to Largest
African Nation, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Jan. 30, 2004, at 10A.
66. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 585 [hereinafter Biological Warfare Convention]. North Korea joined on March 13, 1987.
See id.
67. Federation of American Scientists, North Korea Special Weapons Guide: Biological
Weapons Program, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/bw/index.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2005).
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Unlike the Biological Weapons Convention, North Korea did not sign the
Chemical Weapons Convention.68 Consistent with its refusal to sign, North
Korea has a formidable assemblage of such weapons.69 North Korean military
doctrine asserts the use of chemical weapons as standard weaponry, which
makes the use of chemical weapons in a fashion akin to conventional weapons
a looming concern.70 The choice not to sign the Chemical Weapons
Convention involved conflict within the regime and illustrates the dominance
of military considerations in the country.71
III. THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH NORTH KOREA
A.

Projections Regarding Another Korean War

Military planners project that in the event of a North Korean full-scale
invasion, the first several months of conflict could see some 300,000 to half a
million casualties in the South Korean and U.S. militaries, as well as additional
“hundreds of thousands of” civilian casualties.72 According to Doug Bandow
68. Convention on Chemical Weapons: Hearing on Treaty Doc. 103–21 Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. 2 (1996) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations).
69. North Korea is purported to possess the technology to produce nerve, blister, choking,
and blood agents in large quantities. It already has copious stockpiles of sarin and mustard gas,
as well as blood agents, choking gases, VX, and riot control agents in unknown amounts. In all,
U.S. intelligence reports—as a low figure—some 180–250 tons of chemical weapons. High
estimates place the figure at between 2,500 to 5,000 tons. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE, U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND
ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS, Jan. 1 through June 30, 2001, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2001.htm; Federation of American Scientists,
North Korea Special Weapons Guide: Chemical Weapons Program, http://www.fas.org/nuke/
guide/dprk/cw/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006); U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, PROLIFERATION: THREAT
AND RESPONSE (1996), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/ne_asia.html;
Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea Profile Chemical Overview, http://www.nti.org/
e_research/profiles/NK/Chemical/index.html.
70. See generally Attack Across the DMZ Special Report, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REV., Apr.
1, 1994, at 22 [hereinafter DMZ Special Report].
71. This confrontation took place between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the
Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces (MPAF). SUNG CHULL KIM ET AL., NORTH KOREA IN
CRISIS: AN ASSESSMENT OF REGIME SUSTAINABILITY 58 (1997). The MFA briefed Kim Jong-Il
on the tactical value of signing the Chemical Weapons Convention. Id. However, rather than
take the MFA’s advice, the Deputy Minister of the MFA had to complete a full year
“revolutionization course” before he could resume his post. Id. The reason for this punishment
was the violation of reporting rules. Id.
72. R. Jeffrey Smith, North Korea Deal Urged by State Dept., WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1993,
at A15; Drennan, supra note 10, at 191; PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS, CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION
STUDIES, MILITARY OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM (Jan.
27, 2003), http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm.
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of the Cato Institute, total casualties for such a war could exceed one million.73
Oplan 5027, the U.S. military’s plan for the region, anticipates massive attacks
on Seoul with artillery and rockets, possibly turning Seoul into a “sea of fire”
through launching up to half a million shells per hour.74 A pre-emptive strike
on North Korea could result in a counter-attack by North Korea that would
inflict huge levels of casualties and damage before the South Korean and U.S.
military could do much to block such attacks75 or pre-emptively defang the
North Korean military by military force.76 While analysts typically project an
eventual South Korean/American victory, this victory would come at a great
price;77 some might call it a Pyrrhic victory.
There exists a more devious possibility that North Korea has hinted at by
firing missiles over Japan, kidnapping Japanese citizens, and other hostile
actions: North Korea could attack U.S. bases in Japan.78 In this scenario,
North Korea would probably seek to fray or split the alliance between the U.S.
and South Korea, and possibly move towards uniting the two Koreas.79 Given
the rising anti-U.S. sentiment, especially among the younger generations of
South Koreans, the tilt in the South Korean government towards socialism, the
friendly overtures of South Korea (both governmental and private) to North
Korea, the prevalent pro-North Korean and anti-American media bias, North
Korean infiltrations in South Korea, and the strong desire of the Korean
populace to unite, such a scheme takes on increased credibility.80
Regardless of whether or not North Korea attacks U.S. military bases in
Japan, it can still attack, or threaten to attack, Japanese targets. In one
73. Doug Bandow, N. Korea Is No Place to Apply Iraq ‘Lessons,’ L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2003, at B13.
74. Paul Richter, Two-War Strategy Faces Test, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at A1.
75. SAUNDERS, supra note 72 (“The biggest military concern in striking North Korean
nuclear facilities is the threat of North Korean counter-attacks.”).
76. North Korea’s military assets are very numerous. Id. To make it even more difficult,
these arms often have mobile capabilities or find shelter in caves or underground. Id. Although a
number of nuclear sites are known, some of the sites are heavily reinforced and armored, and
other sites, such as nuclear reactors and reprocessing plants (especially for uranium) could be
functional in small, underground facilities. Id.; see also North Korean Missile Proliferation:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Security, Proliferation, and Fed. Services of the S. Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong. 6–7 (1997) (statement of Choi Ju-Hwal, Former Official,
Ministry of the People’s Army, stating that “since the North uses mostly mobile rocket launchers,
not fixed ones, it is assumed that the North does not have fixed rocket launchers”).
77. See DMZ Special Report, supra note 70; see also Linda D. Kozaryn, Despite Progress,
North Korea Poses Major Threat, AM. FORCES INFO. SERVICE NEWS ARTICLES, Apr. 3, 2001,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2001/n04032001_200104031.html; Eleanor Hall, North
Korea a Greater Threat than Iraq: Analyst (ABC Local Radio Broadcast, Australia, Feb. 13,
2003), available at http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/s783676.htm.
78. See Hall, supra note 77.
79. Id.
80. See infra discussion at “Ethnic and Nationalistic Propaganda,” Part V.D.
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conceivable scenario, North Korea can blitzkrieg the South, and then threaten
to destroy major Japanese cities if the United States sends reinforcements.
North Korea seeks to weaken America’s will to defend South Korea, foment
favorable political conditions in South Korea, and then wage war to distract its
own populace from its extensive woes.81 Official North Korean policy
maintains the objective of re-unifying Korea by force; it considers a violent
Communist revolution of the South to be its manifest destiny.82
South Korea, for many reasons—including economic, political, historical
and humanitarian—has strong incentives to avoid the outbreak of another war
on the Korean peninsula.83 In one form or another, war does not present itself
as an attractive option.
B.

Resources
1.

North Korean Military

The North Korean situation requires a delicate balance. At one extreme,
the risk of war, which would prove disastrous for the entire peninsula; and at
the other extreme, the risk of blackmail and exploitation, in which North Korea
would receive benefits that it would divert for its own devious ends. It is
advisable to explore both extremes in order to find the parameters for the best
solutions. This section of the Article focuses on the extreme of potential war.
The devastating capabilities North Korea possesses must be kept in mind.
In conventional weapons alone, it is one of the leading countries in the world
in total number of military units.84 While it may be accurately stated that some
of these units are not the most state-of-the-art weapons available, the sheer
overwhelming numbers nonetheless make North Korea appear a menacing foe
indeed. North Korea has many artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles pointed
and ready to turn the city of Seoul into rubble.85 North Korea boasts the ability
to field approximately five to seven million troops; it already has about
1,000,000 soldiers in its standing forces, 120,000 special operation forces,

81. See Lee, supra note 14, at 154–55 (describing the North’s power with respect to the
South, Japan, and the United States).
82. See id. at 156–58.
83. See, e.g., SAUNDERS, supra note 72 (speculating on the negative consequences to South
Korea, both physical and political, should war break out).
84. See generally Kathleen T. Rhem, North Korean Military ‘Very Credible Conventional
Force,’ AM. FORCES INFO. SERVICE NEWS ARTICLES, Nov. 18, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Nov2003/n11182003200311181.html.
85. Seoul, one of the most populous cities in the world, contains about a quarter of South
Korea’s population. See Wikipedia, Seoul, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/seoul (last visited Oct.
16, 2005); THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 793 (2005). It sits not more than 30
miles away from the DMZ. Denis Warner, A Village Thrives Near the DMZ, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 11, 1996, at 9.
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11,000 forward deployed artillery pieces, 1,700 aircraft, 800 ships, 500 170millimeter guns, 200 multiple-launch rocket systems, 62 submarines, cave and
underground bases, air defense weapons, mobile missile launchers, and other
potential causes of military mayhem.86
One of the questions that remains is what sort of missile delivery
technology does North Korea possess, and is that technology sufficient to
deliver a nuclear warhead to the United States of America? It is safe to say
that North Korea presently has the missile delivery technology to strike South
Korea and Japan, and, if they so foolishly desired, to strike various parts of
China as well.87 The huge population densities of both South Korea and Japan
would make such weapons, especially nuclear weapons, particularly
destructive as they would take more lives per square mile than other locales—
due to the greater number of people per unit of area.
While the might of the U.S. military would likely be able to eventually win
or at least maintain or return to the status quo in a fight against North Korea
alone, it would probably do so at great cost. The cost of human lives and
property on the Korean peninsula could dwarf the casualties suffered during
the first Korean War.
Additionally, and more alarming, is the possibility for another Korean war
to draw in China.88 After all, during the Korean War, it was the Chinese forces
that turned back the U.N. forces as they were approaching the Yalu River near
the Chinese border.89 China would want to maintain North Korea as a buffer
between it and South Korea, both geographically and ideologically.90
2.

The U.S. Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula

a.

Nuclear

The U.S. nuclear presence in Korea has steadily dwindled to none. In
1967, the United States had 2,600 nuclear weapons in Korea and Okinawa.91

86. See Hall, supra note 77; Kozaryn, supra note 77 (North Korea has six million reservists);
Rhem, supra note 84 (citing Gen. Leon LaPorte, commander of U.S. forces in South Korea);
SAUNDERS, supra note 72.
87. See generally PINKSTON ET AL., supra note 12.
88. But see CHARLES M. PERRY & TOSHI YOSHIHARA, THE U.S.–JAPAN ALLIANCE 78
(2003) (China told Pyongyang in the mid-1990s that China will not participate in any future
Korean conflict).
89. JAMES E. HOARE & SUSAN PARES, CONFLICT IN KOREA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 145
(1999).
90. See id.
91. Robert S. Norris et al., Where They Were, 55 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 26, 26–35
(1999), available at http://www.thebulletin.org/print.php?art_ofn=nd99norris_024. See generally
The Nuclear Information Project: A History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea, Sept. 28,
2005, http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/koreahistory.htm.
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The number of nuclear weapons in Korea decreased to 151 by 1985,92 and in
1991, the United States removed all of its nuclear weapons from Korea.93
However, because the United States has long-range delivery systems, the
presence of nuclear weapons in Korea—or even Asia—carries less significance
than if the United States had only mid-range or short-range delivery abilities.94
b.

Conventional

The U.S. Army has about 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea.95 These
troops have ample equipment, such as Apache helicopters and Patriot missile
batteries.96 The largest forward-deployed fleet of the Navy, the 7th Fleet, rests
not far from the shores of North Korea.97 Around 200 aircraft, forty to fifty
ships,98 and some 20,000 Navy and Marine personnel constitute the 7th Fleet.99
Air Force deployment in the Pacific numbers 45,000 military and civilian
personnel—with about 300 fighter and attack aircraft under its control.100 The
Seventh Air Force perches in Korea with the Fifth in Japan.101
These forces in the Pacific, some in and around Korea and Japan, can
respond rapidly to an outbreak of hostilities. At the same time, the ability to
quickly deploy additional military resources enables rapid reinforcement of the
present numbers.

92. Robert S. Norris & William M. Arkin, Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Locations, 1995, 51 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 74, 74–75 (1995), available at
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/nd95nukenote.html.
93. See Benjamin Friedman, Fact Sheet: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, Jan. 23,
2003, http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/nk-fact-sheet-pr.cfm. South Korea was the last forward nuclear
base for the United States in the Pacific. See Norris et al., supra note 91.
94. See CHARLES J. MOXLEY, JR., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
POST COLD WAR WORLD 501–14 (2000).
95. Friedman, supra note 93.
96. U.S. Forces Order of Battle, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/korea-orbat.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
97. Seventh Fleet–Forward Presence, http://www.c7f.navy.mil/New/Pages/Forward%20
presence.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
98. Id. The ships typically include three to five Aegis guided-missile cruisers, five to ten
destroyers and frigates, and one to two aircraft carriers. Id.
99. Id. Eighteen of these ships use Japan and Guam as their bases. Id.
100. United States Air Force Factsheet: Pacific Air Forces, http://www.osan.af.mil/Facts/
Pacific%20Air%20Forces.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
101. U.S. Embassy in Thailand, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific
Region, http://bangkok.usembassy.gov/services/docs/reports/ussec1.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2005). The Seventh Air Force includes the Fifty-first and Eighth Fighter Wings, with a combined
117 planes and 8,300 air force personnel. See 7th Air Force, http://www.osan.af.mil/
7th%20Air%20Force.htm (April 2003). The Fifty-first uses A-10 aircraft as well as squadrons of
F-16 fighter aircraft. See 51st Fighter Wing Osan AB, Korea, http://www.osan.af.mil/ (last
visited Nov. 12, 2005).
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With mandatory military service for male citizens, South Korea can
mobilize approximately 4,500,000 well-equipped soldiers with newer
armaments than their North Korean counterparts, such as more than 3,000
tanks and 1,500 strike aircraft.102 Approximately 5,300 mortars and two
surface-to-surface battalions add to the South Korean military resources.103
b.

Economic

The robust South Korean economy, once the second to poorest at the end
of the Korean War, now stands as the 11th largest economy in the world, with
a per capita G.N.P. of U.S. $14,000.104 It would have large capabilities to
sustain a war effort, if those capabilities would not already find themselves
devastated by a North Korean attack. However, after another war with North
Korea, the South Korean economy might end up flattened even more than after
the first Korean War105 because there exists more to destroy—whether
infrastructure, industry, edifices, or people.
C. Kim Jong-Il106
At the other extreme from full-out warfare are the problems that result
from deceit and blackmail in the political arena. In the case of North Korea,
politics flow from the top—North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il.107 Early
intelligence wrongfully assessed Kim Jong-Il as unintelligent.
Later
intelligence corrected this earlier assessment, and concluded instead that Kim
possesses a high-powered intellect. Estimates of his I.Q. have placed it at
around 150.108

102. Kozaryn, supra note 77.
103. Orders of Battle and Major Equipment South Korea and North Korea,
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok/orbat-comp.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
104. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND
NOTE: SOUTH KOREA, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
105. Bruce Howard, Professor of Economics, Wheaton College, Economics Lecture (1996)
(asserting that war in a country devastates a country’s economy more than anything else).
106. For a recent narrative on Kim Jong-Il and the country he dominates, see MICHAEL
BREEN, KIM JONG-IL: NORTH KOREA’S DEAR LEADER (2004). Breen’s anecdotes and
observations based on actual visits offer insight into this closed country and its reclusive ruler.
107. See Peter Carlson, Sins of the Son: Kim Jong Il’s North Korea Is in Ruins, But Why
Should That Spoil His Fun?, WASH. POST, May 11, 2003, at D1.
108. See id.
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Kim Il Sung groomed his son Kim Jong-Il to take the reins of power from
him starting in the early 1970s.109 As Korean Workers Party Secretary, Kim
Jong-Il ran the organization, including its propaganda function.110 In 1980, the
Sixth Party Congress named him the official successor.111 In 1991, Kim JongIl ascended to the position of Supreme Commander of the People’s Army, and
in 1993, he rose to Chairman of the National Defense Committee.112
Throughout this time, propaganda deifying Kim Jong-Il drummed its way into
the day-to-day life of North Korea.113
According to defectors from North Korea itself, the North Korean
populace, in spite of the propaganda, is aware of Kim Jong-Il’s immoral
behavior, the failure of his economic policies, and the politicized nature of his
inner circle.114 The deterioration of the country on many fronts would tend to
diminish the glorified image of this totalitarian dictator.115
IV. THE PRESENT CRISIS
A.

History of the Geneva Protocol

The 1994 Agreed Framework116 resulted from intensive negotiations, and
marked a departure from the otherwise relatively uniform policy of the Clinton
administration toward what it termed “rogue states.”117 U.S. policy towards
North Korea, dubbed “limited engagement by necessity,” emerged out of
heated discussion and debate, both within the Clinton administration and also
within the Republican-led Congress.118 During this debate, policymakers
considered a range of options, including preemptive strikes against the known
nuclear facilities, proposed sanctions, and a negotiated agreement with North
Korea.119 Nothing more than a focused preemptive attack solely on the nuclear
facilities carried with it, even according to the military leaders at the time, too
much risk of a full-blown war.120 The Clinton administration had actually

109. KIM ET AL., supra note 71, at 35; SANG-WOO RHEE, SECURITY AND UNIFICATION OF
KOREA 7 (1983).
110. KIM ET AL., supra note 71, at 35.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 35–36.
113. Id. at 36.
114. Id. at 36, 38.
115. See KIM ET AL., supra note 71, at 38.
116. Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the Korean
Peninsula, U.S.–N. Korea, Oct. 21, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 603 [hereinafter Agreed Framework].
117. LITWAK, supra note 47, at 198.
118. Id. at 199.
119. Id. at 214–16.
120. Id. at 214.
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started pursuing the sanctions option when a visit to Pyongyang by former
president Jimmy Carter renewed negotiation efforts.121
With the reluctant permission of President Clinton (permission that
President George H.W. Bush had previously refused to give), Jimmy Carter
went on a peacemaking mission to Pyongyang.122 Upon Carter’s return, he
pronounced the end of the crisis, with Kim Il Sung agreeing to freeze North
Korea’s nuclear program under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspections, and his willingness to come back to the bargaining table with the
then-current U.S. administration.123 This trip served as a catalyst for the
negotiations that led to the Geneva Protocol, also known as the Agreed
Framework.124
The planned initial meeting between the DPRK and the United States in
Geneva found itself suspended due to the demise of Kim Il Sung, the selfstyled “Great Leader” who had ruled North Korea from its inception until July
9, 1994.125 After a one-month delay, the negotiation resumed. A joint
statement emerged on August 12, which announced the core of the
agreement.126 U.S. Ambassador Gallucci and North Korea’s First Vice
Foreign Minister concluded the agreement on October 17, and signed it on
October 21.127 The four-page document was a carefully crafted agreement
implementing the DPRK’s transition from graphite-moderated nuclear reactors
to light water reactors.128 This transition was scheduled to take place over a
decade, buttressed by substantial commitments from the U.S. to replace lost
generating capacity through shipments of heavy oil.129 The agreement met
resistance from some quarters as a “sellout and an act of appeasement.”130
Others hailed it as a major achievement for peace on the peninsula.131
B.

Breach of the Agreement and the Current Situation

As events have unfolded afterwards, it has become obvious that North
Korea has materially breached the Agreed Framework. In 1998, U.S.
121. Id. at 214–16; Drennan, supra note 10, at 158–59.
122. LITWAK, supra note 47, at 216.
123. GILLS, supra note 7, at 243; LITWAK, supra note 47, at 216; Drennan, supra note 10, at
177.
124. LITWAK, supra note 47, at 218; see Agreed Framework, supra note 116.
125. LITWAK, supra note 47, at 218.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 218–19.
130. LITWAK, supra note 47, at 220.
131. See id. Of course, the Clinton administration was under the misapprehension that the
North Korean regime was not going to last long. Id. at 227. They felt that “the Agreed
Framework is almost certainly a sufficient period of time for [the North Korean] regime to have
collapsed.” Id.
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intelligence discovered a large underground facility that could support nuclear
weapon development.132 In a 2002 meeting with Ambassador Kelly, a North
Korean official disclosed North Korea’s possession of nuclear weaponry, a
statement later denied by Pyongyang.133
Given the breach of contract, in November 2002, the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) suspended shipment of heavy oil
and scrapped the Light Water Reactor (LWR) project.134 North Korea claimed
the U.S. breached the agreement and stated that it must develop and produce
nuclear weapons as a deterrent against potential American aggression, which it
claimed to genuinely fear.135 North Korea then withdrew from the ongoing
six-party talks—formerly involving itself, South Korea, the U.S., Japan, China,
and Russia.136 The Bush administration has refused to engage in bilateral
negotiations thus far with Pyongyang in an effort to avoid what it sees as
blackmail.137
V. VARIOUS RESPONSES TO NORTH KOREA
North Korea’s behavior regarding nuclear weapons has led many
American sources—ranging from scholars and politicians to comedians and
talk show hosts—to suggest that North Korea acts and speaks in a crazy and
irrational manner.138 While it may be correct to speak about North Korea in
this fashion if one incorporates a moral dimension to those statements, it is
inaccurate in terms of whether or not North Korea’s behavior and speech is
logically connected with its own goals and objectives.
North Korean officials have the objectives of holding on to power,
removing American involvement in the peninsula, reunifying Korea by force,
and wresting benefits from other countries through the use of threats and
coercion due to the deteriorated condition of their own country.139
Understanding these goals will help one to make sense of North Korea’s
actions—as insidious as many of these resulting activities have been. Though

132. Id. at 222, 225; see also No Nukes Warning from Clinton to N. Korea, CNN.COM, Nov.
21, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9811/21/korea.01/index.html.
133. See Kerr, supra note 11. In 2005, North Korea publicly announced that it had already
developed nuclear weapons. Timeline, supra note 11.
134. Kerr, supra note 11.
135. See PINKSTON ET AL., supra note 12.
136. Timeline, supra note 11.
137. See PINKSTON ET AL., supra note 12.
138. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 14, at 155–58. David Letterman, host of The Late Show, when
discussing North Korea, frequently refers to Kim Jong-Il and his son “Menta Lee Il (Mentally
Ill).” James Brooke, Pop Culture Takes Aim at North Korea’s Kim, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 1,
2005, at 2. The recent movie Team America: World Police portrayed an ego-maniacal Kim JongIl as the primary villain. Id.
139. See Lee, supra note 14, at 154–57.
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dangerous and seemingly desperate, the actions of North Korea are not
irrational or illogical. Perhaps the single biggest mistake made by the United
States and South Korea in past dealings with North Korea has been to ignore or
misinterpret this logic. This section analyzes past dealings in four major
areas—military, political, economic, and ethnic—to show that past responses
to North Korea have been inadequate or wrong-headed. Then, it recommends
better solutions for dealing in each of these four areas. The Article concludes
by focusing on potential solutions relating to international legal theory.
A.

Military
1.

Background

As the preceding sections make clear, North Korea’s most obvious—and,
for the world, dangerous—goals are militaristic: holding on to power in its
totalitarian dictatorship, reunifying Korea by force, and extracting benefits
from other countries through the use of threats and coercion.140 It should be no
surprise that North Korea has doggedly continued with its belligerent and
hostile actions toward the United States and South Korea since the cease-fire—
whether through naval battles with South Korea, frequent border skirmishes, or
intentional incursions into South Korea with thousands of armed agents.141
These actions have extended to Japan as well.142 Time after time, North Korea
has persistently sought these aforementioned objectives, often in overtly
hostile ways.
2.

Past Military Responses

As noted above, the response by key countries such as South Korea, the
United States, and Japan has been to reduce their military force relative to
North Korea.143 Because North Korea’s goal is to unify Korea, by force if
necessary, then such a response moves in the wrong direction. For example,
one devious way in which North Korea may seek to start a war is by having its
own soldiers dress in South Korean military uniforms and pretend to invade
North Korea; in response to this phony incursion, North Korea would then
attack South Korea with the justification of having been “attacked” first.

140. Id.
141. See JOSEPH S. BERMUDEZ, JR., TERRORISM: THE NORTH KOREAN CONNECTION 24–54
(1990); RHEE, supra note 109, at 210.
142. See BERMUDEZ, supra note 141, at 146–154. North Korean agents kidnapped at least
thirteen Japanese nationals, forcing them to teach Japanese language and culture while using their
identities to infiltrate South Korea and Japan. Robert J. Lundin III, Note, International Justice:
Who Should be Held Responsible for the Kidnapping of Thirteen Japanese Citizens?, 13
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 699, 700–01 (2003).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 91–103.
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Indeed, North Korea has actually engaged in military exercises practicing such
a subterfuge.144
3.

Recommended Military Solutions

A better solution would be for these nations to increase the defensive
capabilities of their military. The South Korean military should ready itself
because the belligerent rhetoric of North Korea has sometimes spilled into
combat. Importantly, South Korea needs to have enough of a deterrent—
especially in terms of defensive measures—readily at hand.145 Such measures
should discourage the outbreak of war and send a clear message to North
Korea that they would meet vigorous resistance and ultimately find defeat if
they instigate another war.
Another option is for Japan to indicate that it will bolster its military in
order to defend against the North Korean threat, which perhaps could motivate
China to persuade North Korea to disarm.146 In recent years, Japan has taken a
harder line towards North Korea, but so far has increased only its defensive
and not offensive capabilities.147 If it looks like the United States is behind
that effort though (as in the efforts of U.S. Rep. Tom Lantos),148 then perhaps
it would not achieve the desired effect.
Finally, the U.S. should at least send greater defensive reinforcements,
such as more Patriot missile batteries.149 The emphasis on defense forecloses
reasonable pretexts for North Korea to attack preemptively by considering
buildup of offensive capabilities as an indicator of imminent U.S. attack.
North Korea might try to claim that America is building up its military forces
in and around the peninsula in order to attack North Korea: Pyongyang could,
for example, draw analogies to the military buildup in Iraq prior to the first

144. See Barry A. Feinstein & Justus Reid Weiner, Israel’s Security Barrier: An International
Comparative Analysis and Legal Evaluation, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 309, 331 (2005).
145. See BERMUDEZ, supra note 141, at 24–54 (describing extensive North Korean acts of
terrorism and violence); HOARE & PARES, supra note 89, at xxiii (same).
146. See PERRY & YOSHIHARA, supra note 88, at 47, 81, 130.
147. Cronin, supra note 48, at 53–54; see also Christopher W. Hughes, Japan–North Korea
Relations: Obstacles to a Breakthrough, in COOPERATION AND REFORM ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA 28, 35–36 (James M. Lister et al. eds., 2002).
148. California Congressman Tam Lantos visited North Korea two times in 2005 seeking a
“normalization of relations” between North Korea and the United States. Christian Caryl, Tom
Lantos: A ‘Promising Promise,’ NEWSWEEK INT’L, Sept. 19, 2005, at 64.
149. Cf. JONG CHUL PARK, KOREA’S ENGAGEMENT POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS TO THE U.S. 14–16 (2001) (suggesting that the United States simultaneously
pursue missile defense and negotiations); PERRY & YOSHIHARA, supra note 88, at 138–46
(suggesting that the United States pursue missile defense).
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Gulf war.150 However, primarily defensive reinforcements would at once take
away such an excuse while preparing for a possible attack by North Korea.
B.

Political
1.

Background

The North Korean pattern of brinkmanship or “negotiating on the edge”—
as Scott Snyder has put it in his book by that title,151 and as shown in a recent
book on North Korean negotiation strategy—is in five steps: (1) escalate the
crisis; (2) use it to gain bargaining leverage to get the desired parties (most
particularly the United States) to the table, such as the Clinton administration
for bilateral negotiations; (3) as a result of the crisis, to come to an agreement,
which (4) gives North Korea benefits, which it swallows; and then (5) not
abide by its promises, break the agreement, and create another crisis—thus
starting this cycle again.152
What must also be recognized is that deception and the breaking of its
word have been the norm, not the exception, for North Korea. In addition to
deceiving the international community, North Korea pumps a steady stream of
lies to its own populace. Its propaganda states ridiculous things: that South
Korea is in much worse economic condition than North Korea; the outlandish
deification of the dictator Kim Jong-Il; the ever present threat of attack from
South Korea and the United States; and the false promises that a communist
utopia will come about if the populace just perseveres a little bit longer.153
Also, North Korea levels a steady stream of wild accusations against South
Korea and the United States that probably would better describe North Korea’s

150. See Drennan, supra note 10, at 190. The U.S.–South Korean alliance has been and will
continue to be a primary deterrent against North Korean aggression, so these two nations must not
only continue but also must strengthen their ties. Stephen W. Bosworth, U.S.–Korean Relations
After the Summit, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 25, 27 (2001).
151. SCOTT SNYDER, NEGOTIATING ON THE EDGE: NORTH KOREAN NEGOTIATING
BEHAVIOR (1999).
152. See id. at 68–96; Hyun Joon Chon, Characteristics of North Korea’s South Korean
Policy, in KINU RESEARCH ABSTRACTS ‘02, at 39, 40–41 (2003); see also LITWAK, supra note
47, at 226 (quoting a former North Korean theoretician: “[North Korean officials] understand that
there is no alternative to brinkmanship.”).
153. See, e.g., KIM IL SUNG, FOR THE INDEPENDENT PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA
(1975); Li Jong Mok, Speeches to the United Nations (Oct. 21, 27, 29, 1975), in ON THE
QUESTION OF KOREA: SPEECHES OF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE 30TH SESSION OF THE U.N.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1, 1–25 (1976); Park Chung Hee, Speech, North Korean Communists’
Deceptive Double Tactics (January 14, 1975), in TOWARD PEACEFUL UNIFICATION 110 (1976);
Park Chung Hee, Speech, Peace Propaganda and Warlike Provocations (July 4, 1975), in
TOWARD PEACEFUL UNIFICATION, supra, at 116.
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actions and position than what either South Korea or the United States have
done against North Korea.154
One recurring problem involves North Korean efforts to negotiate directly
with the U.S. while sidelining South Korea.155 Given the continuing North
Korean policy that fails to officially recognize or engage in official diplomacy
with South Korea,156 and continues on the path of seeking forceful
reunification,157 there exist continuing tensions about how to conduct
multilateral negotiations.158
2.

Responses to North Korean Deceit and Brinkmanship

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice recently responded to North Korean
accusations that the United States is hostile toward North Korea and is about to
wage war and attack North Korea. Secretary Rice called such rhetoric
ridiculous—that the United States has no war plans against North Korea
presently.159 These recent accusations amount to nothing more than the
continued spewing of the North Korean propaganda machine and the lineup of
lies that it regularly puts forth to its populace.160
154. See SUNG, supra note 153; Kim Il Sung, Speech at Pyongyang Mass Meeting (June 23,
1973), in KOREAN UNIFICATION: SOURCE MATERIALS WITH AN INTRODUCTION 340 (Se-Jin Kim
ed., 1976). Kim Il Sung refers to “the U.S. imperialist occupation of south Korea,” id. at 341, and
accuses the United States of engaging in “machinations,” and “double-dealing tactics.” Id. at
342.
155. Lee, supra note 14, at 151–52.
156. The 2000 Summit remains an insubstantial anomaly that achieved greater support from
South Korea to North Korea while ultimately giving South Korea very little; North Korea lost
next to nothing by agreeing to the reunion of families, its largest “concession.” See generally
MARK E. MANYIN, NORTH–SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS: A CHRONOLOGY OF THE “NEW”
DIALOGUE 1–2 (2001), http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30811.pdf.
157. See Lee, supra note 14, at 155–58.
158. For a more thorough discussion of the need for all six nations to be involved, and why no
single nation should predominate, see Ilpyong J. Kim, The Major Powers and the Korean
Triangle, in TWO KOREAS—ONE FUTURE?; A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMMITTEE 119 (John Sullivan & Roberta Foss eds., 1987) [hereinafter TWO
KOREAS—ONE FUTURE?].
159. Joel Brinkley & Steven R. Weisman, Visiting Korea Base, Rice Sends Forceful
Reminder to the North, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at 11.
160. See PINKSTON ET AL., supra note 12.
For years, Pyongyang has expressed its desire to improve relations with the United States,
while paradoxically issuing belligerent statements towards Washington. For example, on
February 2, 2005, the North Korean media broadcast a statement by a North Korean Air
Force officer declaring that the North Korean military would turn U.S. military bases into
a “sea of fire” if the United State attacked the DPRK.
Id.; see also Glenn Kessler, Three Little Words Matter to N. Korea: Bush Has Avoided ‘No
Hostile Intent,’ WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2005, at A10 (reporting that the Bush administration
repeatedly states that it has no intention to invade North Korea, but backs away from the Clintonera phrase “no hostile intent”).
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Although these actions by Rice indicate an awareness of North Korean
tactics, other parts of our government do not seem to appreciate fully how
North Korea operates. Pronouncements by U.S. Representative Curt Weldon,
who was part of a recent Congressional delegation to North Korea, appear
overly optimistic. Shortly after his return, Weldon claimed that North Korea
anticipated denuclearizing.161 Not long after that press conference—within a
matter of weeks—North Korea announced unabashedly to the world that it
possessed nuclear weapons.162 Thereafter, U.S. Rep. Tom Lantos, the ranking
democratic foreign relations committee member, in a speech at John Hopkins’
School of Advanced International Studies, drew a parallel to the example of
Libya’s reaping economic and political benefits after it voluntarily disarmed its
arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.163 Such a prospect does not reflect
North Korea’s past patterns of behavior.164
3.

Recommended Political Solutions

While U.S. Representative Lantos acknowledged that it is a “long shot”
that North Korea would follow the path of Libya,165 his words nonetheless
indicate that members of Congress want to take a softer approach than the
Bush administration.166 The present administration’s insistence on six-party
talks, rather than bilateral negotiations directly with North Korea, helps to
counter North Korea’s attempt to go over the head of South Korea—and for
that matter, over the heads of its regional neighbors—to directly negotiate with
the United States.167 Such bilateral talks, which led to the 1994 Agreed
Framework, not only failed, but also gave additional time for North Korea to

161. Glenn Kessler, N. Korea Talks May Hinge on Bush: Lawmaker Advises Bush to Choose
His Words Carefully, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2005, at A23; Jason Motlagh, North Korea:
Denuclearization is Final Goal, THE WASH. TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 19, 2005,
http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050119-102012-8082r.htm.
162. Motlagh, supra note 161; see also Duffy, supra note 11 (reporting the North Korea’s
February 2005 announcement).
163. Congressman Tom Lantos, Speech at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, Is Libya the Future of North Korea? (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.saisjhu.edu/pubaffairs/SAISarticles05/Lantos_Speech.pdf [hereinafter Lantos Speech].
164. See id.; see also Henry Sokolski, The Qaddafi Precedent, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 26,
2004, at 12, available at http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Writings; Adam
Wolfe, U.S. Attempts to Make an Example Out of Libya Will Fail, PINR.COM, Apr. 24, 2004,
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=163&language_id=1.
165. Lantos Speech, supra note 163.
166. With a new Secretary of State, it is possible there may be some variations from the prior
Secretary in terms of how such matters are approached.
167. Lantos Speech, supra note 163. U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Stephen W.
Bosworth notes the advantage of multi-party talks over bilateral negations because the former
build broad regional consensus that supports dialogue and cooperation between North and South
Korea. See Bosworth, supra note 150, at 25.
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become more dangerous and to reap benefits without meeting its obligations.168
The present administration’s approach, whatever its overall merits, at least
avoids such blackmail.
Lantos did parlay a tactic that might help the United States politically,
although it may have helped even more had the speaker come from outside the
United States. Lantos had spoken to leaders in China and indicated that it was
in China’s interest to see that North Korea disarm its weapons of mass
destruction because of the possibility of Japan’s rearming to defend and deter
North Korean potential aggression with such weapons.169 Given the history of
hostilities that historically had transpired between China and Japan, China
would not want Japan to rearm. Thus, Lantos used the approach that former
Secretary of State George Schultz had suggested would be an effective way to
motivate China to step in to help disarm North Korea.170
C. Economic
1.

Background

If North Korea merely diminished its military spending by approximately
five to ten percent, then it could potentially feed its starving populace; yet, it
refuses to do so.171 It has preferred artillery, tanks, and fighter planes to rice,
kimchi (Korean pickled vegetables), and kalbi (Korean style marinated short
ribs)—thus deciding to be armed to the teeth while turning their populace into
ragged skeletons.
The Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) published an
interesting empirical study that takes the factors used by Zbigniew Brezizinski,
formerly prominent in the Carter administration and now a scholar in the field
of international relations. Brezizinski examined various factors to measure the
degree of crisis within regimes in Eastern Europe to help to predict whether
they would be experiencing impending collapse, transformation, regime
change, and other similar events.172 KINU took the Brezizinski factors, added
some of its own that it deemed appropriate to the North Korean context, and
measured to what extent the North Korean regime is in crisis and the
probability that it would implode.173 KINU’s conclusion, after analysis of
168. See Erik Raines, Note, North Korea: Analyzing the “New” Nuclear Threat, 12
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 349, 359–62 (2004).
169. Lantos Speech, supra note 163.
170. See Steven Kamara, Schultz ‘42 Discusses Solutions to Nuclear Threat from North
Korea, DAILY PRINCETONIAN ONLINE, Apr. 14, 2003, http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/
archives/2003/04/14/news/7921.shtml.
171. See N. Korea: Starving for Missiles, CBSNEWS.COM, Aug. 13, 1999,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1999/08/13/eveningnews/main58131.shtml.
172. KIM ET AL., supra note 71, at iii.
173. Id. at 9.
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political, social, economic, cultural, and other factors, was that even through
1995—when the measurements ended—North Korea had already entered a
crisis level.174 Many of those factors were on a downward trend, meaning that
North Korea was degenerating, potentially leading to regime transformation or
regime change if the trends were not reversed.175
2.

Incentives, Trade, and Humanitarian Aid in Response

Ten years later, if one presumes that at least the majority of those factors
have grown worse, then North Korea has grown closer and closer to imploding
from within. The initial implementation of economic free-enterprise zones
may have helped to start to reverse its economic woes, but more likely, a
greater factor in helping sustain North Korea, as was mentioned earlier, is
increased trade and aid, most particularly from South Korea. Two-way trade
between South and North Korea had risen to $697 million by 2004.176
Predominantly, the amount flowing from North Korea to South Korea was
miniscule, but the numbers have been increasing since that time.177
The head of Hyundai, one of the two giant conglomerates in Korea, has
been funding various projects, including the Mount Kumgang tourism, as well
as an entire industrial zone, various donations, and funds for infrastructure.178
That type of aid from various South Korean sources has been increasing, and
increasing dramatically.179 China is another major source of aid and trade, but
Russia has diminished its aid to North Korea due to its own economic woes.180
What must be realized is that North Korea only engages the international
community to the extent that it thinks it can benefit from such interaction while
continuing to pursue its own inimical goals. While North Korea may have
taken certain steps to increase its diplomatic relationships,181 the depth of those

174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 124.
Id. at 126.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS, supra note 104.
See Sung Chul Yang, South Korea’s Sunshine Policy: Progress and Predicaments, 25
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 33 (2001) (“The policy of separating politics from economic
activities greatly increased inter-Korean trade and investment.”). In a historic move, North Korea
actually shipped shirts to South Korea in 2005. B. J. Lee, An Oasis of Capitalism: South Korea
Companies Explore the Possibilities of Outsourcing to the North, in a New Economic Zone,
NEWSWEEK INT’L, Sept. 19, 2005, at 51.
178. Young Whan Kihl, The DPRK and its Relations with the ROK, in KOREA BRIEFING
1997–1999, at 123, 139 (Kongdan Oh ed., 2000); James Brooke, An Industrial Park in North
Korea Nears a Growth Spurt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at C5.
179. See Yang, supra note 177, at 33–34.
180. PERRY & YOSHIHARA, supra note 88, at 78–87.
181. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
BACKGROUND NOTE: NORTH KOREA (2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm.
North Korea has sought to broaden its formal diplomatic relationships. In July 2000,
North Korea began participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with Foreign
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relationships extends no further than the instrumental pursuit of its own
interests at best.
North Korea claims that if it just gets sufficient humanitarian aid, then it
would be sustained thereby.182 The root problem is more foundational, though:
its economic system has failed.183 North Korea is, however, experimenting
with economic free enterprise zones, which seem to be a step in the right
direction as far as increasing production.184 It has remained, though, unwilling
to cut military spending, which would free the necessary resources to be able
to feed their country.185 The means to help its citizens, and the people inside
North Korea, is within North Korea’s own grasp, but rather than increasing
overall production, it has even cut food rations to a portion of its populace
during the latter part of the 1990s.186
Obviously, to help open up the society and the economy, North Korea
should implement reforms that move towards a more free-market, capitalistic
system that rewards industriousness, productivity, and enterprise. It has made
slight steps in that direction as mentioned, and trade, especially with South
Korea, has increased dramatically187—even as it has evaporated with almost
the entire rest of the world. But North Korean so-called “trade” is more charity
than anything else, where South Korea is helping North Korea, and getting
little to nothing in return, except the continued animosity and hostility of the
Pyongyang regime.188

Minister Paek Nam Sun attending the ARF ministerial meeting in Bangkok. The D.P.R.K.
also expanded its bilateral diplomatic ties in that year, establishing diplomatic relations
with Italy, Australia, and the Philippines. The U.K., Germany, and many other European
countries have established diplomatic relations with the North, as have Australia and
Canada.
Id.
182. See Joseph Kahn, North Korea Says It Will Abandon Nuclear Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2005, at A1.
183. See Yang, supra 177, at 32 (comparing the 1999 per capita incomes and total trade of the
two nations, when North Korea was at $714 per person and $1.48 billion in trade, while South
Korea stood at $8,581 and $263.5 billion respectively).
184. See Brooke, supra note 178.
185. See N. Korea: Starving for Missiles, supra note 171.
186. See James Brooke, Threats and Responses: Asian Arena; Defectors Want to Pry Open
North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at A12. “In the mid-1990’s, during a famine, [a North
Korean defector] recalled, ‘they had this slogan: “without the candy bowls, you can still live; but
without bullets, you cannot survive.”’” Id.
187. Yang, supra note 177, at 33.
188. Id.; Bosworth, supra note 150, at 28 (arguing that the large cost of reconstructing north
Korea’s collapsed economic infrastructure “will have to be carried, in effect, on the balance
sheets of South Korea’s government, South Korea’s corporations, and, ultimately, South Korea’s
households”).
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Representative Lantos indicated that sanctions against North Korea already
exist.189 One scholar suggests that U.S. economic sanctions against North
Korea have not worked to force North Korea to change.190 However, these
sanctions provide a bargaining chip that allows the U.S. to maintain a policy of
containment and appeasement that at least keeps the crisis on the Korean
peninsula from worsening.191
3.

A More Hands-Off Solution to Economic Development

To promote change, however, a better approach would be, at the very least,
continued containment and deterrence, where nations such as Japan and the
United States—and especially South Korea—take the path of patiently waiting,
and perhaps in some ways accelerating, an internal implosion: the demise of
North Korea from within. This would require nothing more than ceasing, or at
least dramatically reducing, trade and humanitarian aid so that North Korea
would be forced to negotiate more broadly—and more honestly.192 Current
trade and humanitarian efforts are undoubtedly paved with good intentions and
compassion. However, they also help to reinforce a terrible regime, one that
has miserably failed its people, so that such aid may be delaying the internal
collapse of North Korea. The one drawback is that North Korea may respond
to economic reductions with military force; thus, South Korea and her allies
must maintain a substantial military deterrent as outlined above.193
One can argue that even if North Korea will collapse, it is better for them
to collapse with better economic conditions in order to alleviate the burden of
South Korea, as well as other nations and organizations that would help.
However, it seems that given the determination of Kim Jong-Il and his regime
to hold on to power at all costs, and to orient the whole regime to maintaining a
grip on power rather than serving the common good of the populace, it is
highly likely that aid to North Korea would only tend to increase the grip that
Kim Jong-Il and his cronies have on the country, especially given the diversion
of aid to government and military personnel rather than the peasants who need
it most.194

189. Lantos Speech, supra note 163.
190. See Drennan, supra note 10, at 159.
191. Paul VanWagenen, Note, U.S. Economic Sanctions—Non-Traditional Success against
North Korea, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 239, 239–40 (2000); see also Harold Hongju Koh, On
American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1494 (2003) (arguing that phasing down
sanctions and increasing food aid would improve U.S.–North Korean talks).
192. International organizations and other nations provide North Korea with hundreds of
thousands of tons of food aid, and South Korea provides over 35 percent of the humanitarian
assistance. Yang, supra note 177, at 32.
193. See discussion supra Part V.A.3.
194. Kongdan Oh calls those who favor trade, “the engagement school,” while those who
think that economic aid to North Korea is not a good idea, “the confrontation school.” Kongdan
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D. Ethnic and Nationalistic Propaganda
1.

Background

Hwang Jang Yop195 indicated that North Korea is seeking to foment
favorable political conditions within South Korea.196 These efforts seem to be
working on various different fronts. For example, the current president and his
predecessor, as well as many members of the South Korean legislature, have
socialist tendencies,197 leading South Korea in the direction towards the failed
communism that has been happening in North Korea. From the government,
there increasingly have been elements that have been favorable towards North
Korea and its system—which is strange, given the domestic disaster that is
North Korea, and the relative paradise by comparison that South Korea has
become.198
Additionally, according to the Seoul bureau chief of Time Magazine,199 the
South Korean media is reluctant to report North Korean abuse and aggression,
whether to Japan or to South Korea itself, but it is quick to trumpet stories that
Oh, The Problem and Promise of Economic Cooperation, in KOREA BRIEFING: TOWARD
REUNIFICATION (David R. McCann ed., 1997). Oh suggests that economic dealing with North
Korea will help only North Korea in the short term, but that eventually South Korea will need to
expand and integrate to sustain its growth. Id. at 46–47.
195. Hwang Jang Yop, the highest-level defector from North Korea, has dedicated the
remainder of his life to try to find the path of peace for the Korean peninsula. James Brooke,
North Korean Defector Plans Talks in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2003, at A5. No better or
higher insider view exists of the reclusive North Korean regime. Previously, he had served as
president of the most prestigious university in North Korea, Kim Il Sung University. Id. Also, he
had headed up the now-defunct legislature. Rebecca Ward, Defector Believes Pyongyang Would
Not Use Weapons of Mass Destruction, INFORMATION WARFARE SITE, http://www.iwar.org.uk/
news-archive/2003/11-04-7.htm. Overall, he held the 24th highest position in the North Korean
hierarchy. Lee Wha Rang, North Korea’s Hwang Jang Yop Saga Continues, KOREA WEB
WEEKLY, http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/nk-whang.htm#how (last visited Mar. 17, 2006).
Hwang also formulated the Juche philosophy, the primary propaganda framework for North
Korea. Brooke, supra, at A5. After defecting, he considered himself a criminal for his
complicity with such a regime: he deeply regrets his involvement at the highest levels of the
North Korean government. See Hwang Jang Yop, Speech to the People of the Republic of Korea
at the R.O.K. Agency for the National Security Planning (July 10, 1997), available at
http://www.fas.org/news/dprk/1997/bg152.html#2 [hereinafter Yop Speech]. One of my law
students translated for him when he addressed the U.S. Congress in 2004.
196. See Rang, supra note 195 (“Hwang’s main theme is that he came over to Seoul to warn
of the ‘impending’ invasion from North.”)
197. See B.J. Lee, Is South Korea Socialist?, NEWSWEEK, July 14, 2003, at 44; Owen
Rathbone, South Korea’s Socialist Face, THE AMERICAN DAILY, July 17, 2003,
http://americandaily.com/article/3092 (“[Current president Roh Moo-hyun] has consistently . . .
shown himself be pro-labor or quasi-socialist.”).
198. Lee, supra note 14, at 159–61.
199. Donald Macintyre, Time Magazine Seoul Bureau Chief, Speech delivered at Handong
International Law School (July 11, 2003).
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magnify any real or perceived transgression of a soldier or any one else from
the United States.200 There has emerged a naiveté combined with wishful
thinking about the intentions of North Korea, and a willful disbelief of the
bellicose intentions of North Korea on the part of a good number of South
Korean youth, who never experienced the Korean War. The Time Magazine
bureau chief said when he visited the law school, at which I served as a
founding professor, that the South Korean media tends to downplay or even
ignore a lot of North Korean acts of aggression, whether it be sending
submarines down to South Korea where spies emerge and infiltrate, or naval
skirmishes between North and South Korea near the borderline, or North
Korea’s wrongful actions against Japan, such as the kidnapping of innocent
Japanese civilians conscripted into teaching North Korean officials
Japanese.201 These stories receive relatively low or little press, whereas when
anything seems even remotely like a U.S. soldier doing wrong, the headlines
magnify disproportionately.202 Such reporting tends to drive a wedge between
South Korea and the United States. North Korea actively has sought to take
advantage of, and deepen, any rifts or disagreements between these allies, as
well as with other involved countries (such as Japan, Russia, and China).203
In addition, South Korean media and other sources, such as books, have
tended to demonize the U.S. while indicating attractive points of North
Korea.204 These sources have helped to inculcate in the younger generations a
sizable degree of anti-Americanism as well as pro-North Korean sentiments.205
North Korea regularly seeks to implant anti-American and pro-North Korean
propaganda in South Korea, and it seems that they have done so successfully to
a large extent.206 As an example, North Korea likes to say that it has to liberate
South Korea from U.S. imperialism and domination, and thus damages the
pride of South Korea by, in essence, speaking of South Korea as if it were a
colony under the thumb of the United States.207
Recently, a professor at Seoul National University (considered the leading
university in South Korea) who had taught sociology at the University for
more than thirty years was discovered to be a North Korean spy after two

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Criminal Jurisdiction Under the U.S.–Korea Status of Forces
Agreement: Problems to Proposals, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 213, 215–16 (2003)
(providing the example of large demonstrations that followed the trial of two U.S. soldiers who
were acquitted by U.S. tribunals, as opposed to South Korean tribunals, of negligent homicide for
running over two South Korean girls in 2002).
203. Lee, supra note 14, at 156–58.
204. See id. at 159.
205. Id. at 158.
206. Id. at 156–58.
207. See id.
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fellow spies were linked to him.208 These spies confessed that this professor
emeritus had been a North Korean spy all along.209 North Korea has thus been
able to infiltrate influential centers of South Korean culture, and the culture,
sadly enough, seems to be swallowing more of the North Korean propaganda
Ironically enough, such devious
and other reinforcing messages.210
communication exists in South Korea because as a developing democracy, it
allows incomparably more freedom of speech than North Korea.
There are also appeals to Korean nationalism, such that the common bond
of Korean ethnicity is touted as being more important than other pieces of
common ground, such as the extensive common ground that the United States
and South Korea share, both in terms of their inner relationship, but also the
common ground in terms of their political systems. North Korea is an entirely
different sort of society economically, politically, religiously, and socially;
there exists much more common ground, and much more of a relationship,
between South Korea and the United States than between South Korea and
North Korea.211 The South Korean media, a significant portion of university
students, and now many government officials in South Korea who are
sympathetic with the North Korean regime, see the United States as a big bully
against North Korea and an exploiter of South Korea.212 These South Koreans
say they see North Korea as one of us, “our people,” as fellow ethnic Koreans.
For many, especially in the generations in South Korea who did not experience
the Korean War, it is possible that affinities with the U.S. politically, socially,
economically, and legally can be overshadowed by the common ethnic blood
that is shared between North and South Korea.
Playing into this misguided identity politics is the strong nationalism of
Koreans as Koreans (not North and South Koreans) and a strong sense of
ethnic identity that has not only survived many invasions, many attacks, and
many attempts to dominate or even colonize it, but has grown stronger in
resistance against outside attacks. That being the case, they are susceptible to
this sort of propaganda and rhetoric. There are many in Korea, especially
among the younger generations and the media, who want the United States out.

208. Nicholas D. Kristof, Seoul Said to Foil Spy Ring for North That Included Top Scholar,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at A7.
209. Id.
210. See Gregory Henderson, The Politics of Korea, in TWO KOREAS—ONE FUTURE?, supra
note 158, at 95, 108 (stating that North Korea “rules through exceedingly concerted and
consistent propaganda and socialization programs in an isolated polity”).
211. See Oh, supra note 40, at 312–15 (explaining that since the Armistice, the political and
economic interests of the two nations have diverged considerably); see also Charles K.
Armstrong, The Politics of Transition in North and South Korea, in KOREA BRIEFING: TOWARD
REUNIFICATION, supra note 194, at 5 (“Beyond the state of transition . . . North and South Korea
can hardly be more different.”).
212. See Lee, supra note 14, at 155–59.
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Indeed, that plays into the hands of North Korean propaganda, which says
South Korea is not free and must be liberated by North Korea from under the
imperialist fist of the U.S.213 This way of thinking and feeling plays right into
the hands of North Korea, and if it was not for the deterrent of American
military might, South Korea might have already been overrun by North Korea,
and there would be a unified Korea under Kim Jong-Il and the totalitarian
dictatorship thereof.
The North Korean regime puts the entire society in a straitjacket. It has at
least ten known concentration camps, where political dissidents are tortured
and executed,214 and a regime that has had many people literally starve to death
or suffer greatly from malnutrition and starvation.215 North Koreans do not
have the ability to socialize freely. They have no freedom of association, no
freedom of press, no freedom of expression, no freedom of speech, and no
freedom of religion.216 The rights, freedoms, and privileges that Americans,
and even South Koreans, can at times take for granted are non-existent in
North Korea. Since there is no freedom of movement either, a North Korean
citizen cannot travel freely out of the country.217 It is an iron cage of a society
with the canary inside wasting away—and certainly not singing.
2.

Responses, or a Lack Thereof

Deep historic ties exist between South Korea and the U.S., given that
South Korea and the U.S. have been close allies over the past half-century. In
fact, the development of the two Koreas is intimately linked to the influence of
other nations. Just as North Korea is an exaggerated version of Maoist China
and Stalinist Soviet Union, through U.S. protection and investment, South
Korea has developed into a much more free-enterprise, democratic, and open
society than its northern counterpart.218 So there are extensive social,
economic, political, religious, educational, and cultural ties.
These ties ought not be taken for granted or subsumed under the anti-U.S.
rhetoric barrage tilting the culture. A solution would be for those in power in
South Korea, and those in the media sympathetic to U.S.–South Korean ties, to
promote the affinities between the two nations. South Korea must learn that all
it has received back from North Korea after it has provided extensive aid and
economic investments has been continued hostility and an unrelenting
213. Id. at 156–58.
214. See Robert Windrem, Death, Terror in N. Korea Gulag, NBCNEWS.COM, Jan. 15, 2003,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3071466.
215. Amnesty Int’l, Starved of Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/
ENGASA240032004 (last visited Mar. 17, 2006).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Henderson, supra note 210, at 108–12.
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aggressive stance against it. South Koreans need to know that they may be
helping to sustain a failed regime, stoking the dying embers of that society.
Whereas if South Korea were not subsidizing North Korea to the extent that it
has, perhaps North Korea would have collapsed already. South Korea may be
unwittingly delaying the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula by virtue
of their propping up of a malignant, totalitarian dictatorship.
VI. LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS TO NORTH KOREA
Although the above sections point to facets of an overall approach to
dealing with North Korea, this Essay climaxes with international legal and
international relations applications, which would do well to consider the above
context.
A.

Multi-party, Not Bilateral, Negotiations
1.

The Problem with Bilateral

China and Russia, among others, have urged appeasement of North
Korea’s repeated demands for a bilateral security agreement with the United
States.219 Such a move would be inadvisable. Hwang Jang Yop, the highestlevel defector from North Korea,220 indicated that North Korea still is intent on
taking over South Korea and the whole peninsula (unification by force is the
official North Korean policy still), and in order to do so, it seeks to take the
U.S. out of the picture.221 The U.S. commitment to defend South Korea is the
principal impediment for North Korea not to take over the peninsula222—after
all, it was the U.S. forces, along with the United Nations and South Korean
forces, which pushed back North Korean aggression during the Korean War.
Thus, it would be a mistake to take Pyongyang’s insistence upon the security
agreement with the United States as simply the paranoid delusions of a regime
that anticipates U.S. aggression to dismantle the regime. Rather, if Hwang
Jang Yop’s diagnosis is correct, and he has the best and highest inside view of
the regime available, it is a very calculated effort for the North Koreans to take

219. Tatiana Zakaurtseva, North Korean Nuclear Issue and Some Ways of Its Settlement from
the Russian Point of View, International Symposium on Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia
123, 130–34 (Jan. 13, 2005) (on file with author); Yunling Zhang, Ending Confrontation in the
Korean Peninsula: The Way Out, International Symposium on Peace and Prosperity in Northeast
Asia 145 (Jan. 13, 2005) (on file with author).
220. See supra note 195.
221. See Rang, supra note 195; Hwang Jang Yop, Letter to Intellectuals of the World: The
Mankind Must Head to Democracy, Daily NK, June 5, 2005, http://www.dailynk.com/english/
read.php?cataID=nk02200&num=166.
222. See Yop, supra note 221 (“Provided that the South Korea-US alliance remains strong,
we can say that South Korea is superior to North Korea militarily.”).
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the United States out of the picture as far as defending South Korea on the
peninsula.223
A recent U.S. bipartisan congressional delegation claimed some success in
speaking with the North Korean government.224 Apparently, in an attempt to
defuse the North Korean nuclear deterrent reasoning for its nuclear weapons
program, the U.S. delegation indicated that Washington did not seek regime
change nor plan a preemptive attack.225 During this visit, the beleaguered
North Korea reportedly offered to become a “friend” of the United States if
Washington did not make inflammatory remarks about Kim Jong-Il’s
regime.226 The North Korean government also stated its desire to resume
“substantive discussions” according to Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) with no
option “off the table,” including an end result of “giving up their nuclear
capability.”227
One should view this claim in light of North Korea’s history of mendacity,
its obsessive effort to keep a grip on power, its past reaping of benefits without
corresponding adherence to the obligations that it agrees to, and its continued
goal to remove the United States from the picture on the peninsula. Even the
day after this meeting, the official, government-controlled newspaper
(Nodohng Shinmuhn) continued its usual anti-American tirades, calling the
U.S. a “nuclear criminal.”228 The North Korean newspaper, given the history
of what has transpired thus far, appears more representative of Pyongyang’s
actual stance. While speaking against the “inflammatory” language of the
U.S., it frequently resorts to inflammatory anti-American language itself.
2.

Multi-lateral the Preferred Course

Although there have been multi-lateral talks in Beijing, they have largely
consisted of recitations of each country’s positions, with no real progress
toward an agreement. The United States, North and South Korea, China,
Japan, and Russia have attempted for months to set up a fourth meeting to
pressure Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons, a development that all the
other countries sans North Korea claim to seek.229 The Six-Party Talks have
thus far failed to make much substantive progress in resolving the current crisis
on the peninsula. For the most part, the delegates from each country have

223. See id.
224. See Sang-Hun Choe, North Korea Back to Usual Line, Calls U.S. a ‘Nuclear Criminal,’
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at 30.
225. Andrew Salmon, N. Korea Will Return to Nuclear Discussions Six-Party Talks May
Resume Within Weeks, U.S. Says, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 15, 2005, at 1.
226. Choe, supra note 224, at 30.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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reiterated their positions and stood their ground.230 There have been minor
agreements as to the setting up of sub-committees that would address issues;
however, no breakthroughs have yet emerged.231 North Korea indefinitely
suspended the Six-Party Talks this year (2005) while giving conditions for it to
return to these multilateral talks.232
The effort to encourage North Korea to continue in the multi-lateral talks,
however, is still a favorable one because it takes North Korea’s regional
neighbors and applies international pressure upon North Korea to disarm.
However, Russia and China have thus far taken a less than tenacious stance
towards North Korea and its nuclear weapons.233 Yet the United States has let
each country know that applying such pressure to North Korea would be
desirable.234
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, indefinite suspension by North Korea,
and the absence of a breakthrough, this approach is better than the United
States appearing to engage in unilateral efforts. Accordingly, the present
administration is doing a fine job of resisting the brinkmanship blackmail that
North Korea again attempts to perpetrate. Allowing North Korea to go straight
to the United States, over the head of South Korea, seriously undermines South
Korea. If there is any bilateral action, it should first and foremost be between
South Korea and North Korea, who after all live on the same peninsula in
question, not North Korea and the U.S.
China’s role could prove critical in resolving the crisis. As North Korea’s
best ally in the world, China’s strong insistence that North Korea denuclearize
the peninsula would carry the most weight. Whether China would do so
remains in considerable doubt.
Russia, which has recently renewed its ties with North Korea, while not as
influential as China, might have some sway with North Korea. North Korea
still owes a sizable monetary debt to Russia.235 Russia could offer a measure
of debt forgiveness as an incentive for North Korea to relinquish its nuclear
weapons and program.
Japan has aligned itself with South Korea and the United States. It takes a
firm stance that North Korea must get rid of its nuclear arms.236 Given North
Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens and the sending of fraudulent bones of

230. See James Brooke & David E. Sanger, North Koreans Say They Hold Nuclear Arms,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A1.
231. Id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. Zakaurtseva, supra note 219.
235. Id.
236. Akio Miyajima, Some Thoughts and Comments on [the] North Korean Nuclear Issue,
International Symposium on Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia 165, 165 (Jan. 13, 2005) (on
file with author).
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one of them when the issue arose, some seventy percent of the Japanese public
supports the levying of sanctions against North Korea.237
B.

A Role for the U.N. Secretary General

These multi-party talks might benefit from outside assistance. The U.N.
Secretary General, currently Kofi Annan, could use his office as a mediator for
multi-party talks.238 Passive attempts to make the Secretary General office
available, as well as attempts to diminish tensions by visiting the respective
countries, South and North Korea, have not helped in the past.239 Yet, when all
U.S. attempts failed, the Secretary General used his office to negotiate the
release of captured U.S. airmen after the Korean War.240 A role as mediator
for an existing multi-party framework may help drive the talks.
North Korea has stated, however, that it does not consider the U.N. a
neutral party.241 The argument stems from the U.N.’s condemnation, and
subsequent military action against, the North Korean aggression that started the
Korean War.242 It conveniently ignores the aid that U.N. organizations have
rendered to North Korea.243
C. Implementing This Strategy
Hwang Jang Yop also indicated that Kim Jong-Il is a coward, and
capriciously changes his decisions based on his mood.244 If that is so, it is
possible that a course of diplomacy that is incrementally increased to the point
of actively going in and disarming North Korea at the last stage of this process
might be the best thing—to call North Korea’s bluff and see whether or not
Kim Jong-Il proves to be as courageous as Saddam Hussein was—darting from
spider hole to spider hole and offering very little resistance to U.S. forces
notwithstanding his inflated rhetoric.
However, this would not be the first or even most desirable step in the
process—it should come only if prior efforts fail. A call for continued multilateral pressure from other countries and international organizations, with
resort as much as possible to international law, should continue—whether or
not North Korea returns to the Six-Party Talks. Additionally, invitations to
237. Id. at 168.
238. CHI YOUNG PAK, KOREA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 99 (2000).
239. Id. at 106–07.
240. Id. at 103.
241. See id. at 101–02 (describing the justification of Secretary General Trygve Lie’s “bold
action” in response to the Korean crisis).
242. See id. at 102.
243. See, e.g., Maggie Farley, U.N. Rejects North Korea’s Assertion That It Can Do Without
Food Aid, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2005, at A6 (describing U.N. efforts to increase humanitarian aid
to North Korea).
244. See Yop Speech, supra note 195.
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North Korea to engage in negotiations either through the good offices of the
U.N. Secretary General and/or to the multi-lateral Six-Party Talks can be
extended to Pyongyang again.
Step by step, the heat can be raised on North Korea, and as the heat is
being raised, the drive for accountable ways (also known as CVID: Complete,
Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement) 245 in which North Korea could
indeed be disarmed can be pursued. After the heat increases sufficiently,
giving some positive incentives for North Korea to comply could increase the
likelihood of a peaceful resolution.246 Both sticks and carrots (but sticks
first247) can be incrementally ratcheted up, step by step, stage by stage, to the
point where if none of these things work, only then would it be time for a very
proactive international effort to disarm North Korea. Such an approach seems
to be the best means of dealing with the North Korean crisis because softer
approaches have clearly failed repeatedly in the past.
Giving positive incentives and a soft landing or a soft way out after turning
up the heat and pressure might be much more persuasive to a regime that
operates on the basis of fear and intimidation of its own people, as well as its
regional neighbors, and indeed, the world.248 Along the lines of this
incremental ratcheting up, it could include an agreement with specific resort
upon noncompliance to the U.N. Security Council and the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), and whatever is maximally possible through the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).249
Along these lines, it could then help to have U.N. Security Council
resolutions (for example, through Article VI of the U.N. Charter)250 or other
assertive action.251 The basis for such resolutions and possible sanctions can

245. Zakaurtseva, supra note 219, at 126.
246. See Robert J. Art, Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?, in THE UNITED STATES
AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, supra note 10, at 359, 402.
247. THE UNITED STATES AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, supra note 10, culls several lessons
from the history of U.S. coercive diplomacy. It seems that in this incremental ratcheting up, the
stakes can be made more and more serious for North Korea, and as that pressure is being applied,
perhaps a way out, including positive incentives for verifiable disarmament could look
increasingly attractive.
248. But see Drennan, supra note 10, at 193–96 (suggesting that the Clinton administration’s
reliance on incentives encouraged Kim Il Sung’s brinkmanship tactics almost to the point that he
finally crossed the only real limit the U.S. had—the development of nuclear weapons).
249. A weakness of the IAEA is that it does not provide for resort to the ICJ. See Drennan,
supra note 10, at 164 (“The IAEA . . . lacks both the mandate and the means to enforce
compliance with the terms of IAEA and [Non-Proliferation Treaty] membership.”).
250. Zakaurtseva, supra note 219, at 142–43, recommends an in camera meeting of the
Security Council.
251. A reason to think that U.N. Security Council action could help is that during the early
1990s, North Korea backed down from its initial threats to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty following an IAEA appeal to the U.N. Security Council. PAK, supra note 238, at 135.
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lie squarely on the multiple instruments of international law that North Korea
has violated. Consider that it has broken every single major agreement that it
has made, whether with other countries or international organizations,
including the biological weapons convention,252 the cease-fire agreement after
the initial Korean War,253 the 1991–92 agreements with South Korea,254 the
2000 agreement after the summit between the leaders of South and North
Korea,255 the 1994 Agreed Framework,256 the IAEA dictates,257 and the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) that it belonged to since 2003.258 Hwang Jang Yop
explains how North Korea only enters into such agreements for tactical gain—
not with any intention to restrict itself based on legal instruments.259
There is an interesting secondary role that the General Assembly can play
if the U.N. Security Council is paralyzed by the abuse of a veto by, for
example, China, who would be the most likely to veto actions, including
resolutions or sanctions against North Korea.260 It can take the initiative to
recommend action by the U.N. Security Council in such situations while
passing resolutions of its own.261
There should be international, not just U.S. verification of North Korea’s
disarmament. Furthermore, there should be international assurance that North
Korea complies with international organizations such as the IAEA, rather than
ejecting the IAEA inspectors, as they did in the past.262 Otherwise, the
acceptability and impunity of nuclear proliferation would be a message learned
by other potentially dangerous regimes. Ideally, it would be best if North
Korea returns to the NPT—given that it was the first country in history to
withdraw from it and disavow it in 2003.263 Regardless of North Korean

252. See Anna Fifield, Asia-Pacific: Pyongyang is Stepping Up its Nuclear Might, Seoul
Claims, FIN. TIMES, USA, Feb. 5, 2005, at 2.
253. PAK, supra note 238, at 84.
254. GILLS, supra note 7, at 233–34.
255. See Oh, supra note 40, at 314–15 (describing the deterioration of the likelihood of
Korean reunification despite the 2000 summit).
256. Koh, supra note 191, at 1492–93.
257. PAK, supra note 238, at 145.
258. Id.
259. Defector Warns of North Korea War Plans, Despite Economic Plight, No Near-Term
Collapse, KOREAUPDATE, July 21, 1997, at 1–2.
260. PAK, supra note 238, at 141–42. This role for the General Assembly emerged out of the
Uniting for Peace resolution precedent. Id. at 110–11.
261. Id. at 110. See id. at 109–14 for a fine delineation of the Uniting for Peace resolution in
the context of the U.N. Charter Articles 10, 11, 12, and 24, and their historic interpretation.
262. See GILLS, supra note 7, at 236.
263. See Koh, supra note 191, at 1493.
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withdrawal from the NPT, there remains little doubt that they breached it while
still a party to it.264
Again, it is worth stressing that South Korean and U.S. military forces
ought to put in place as many defensive measures as possible to deter North
Korean aggression. The United States must reaffirm a strong determination to
defend South Korea. What North Korea would perceive as U.S. weakness or
anticipated non-involvement could prove catastrophic for the peninsula.
In this whole process of external pressure, North Korea could come closer
and closer to an internal collapse,265 in which case the possibility for
reunification exists. On the other hand, the threat of China perhaps stepping in
and grabbing North Korea would then be a distinct possibility. China,
however, denies a desire in this direction.266
There are various factors that have been correlated to increase the
likelihood of success for the course of coercive diplomacy, and each of these
can be applied to the North Korean context.267 Although each context is not
identical to other contexts, certain analogies may be drawn.
VII. CONCLUSION
A situation as complex as the current North Korean crisis268 requires an
understanding of history269 and context, a consideration of options and ideas
from various angles (including legal), and courageous yet not foolhardy
implementation. The stakes could rise as high as not only another Korean
War, but at its worst, even World War III, if countries such as China, Russia,
Japan, and the United States all enter the fray.
On the other hand, a successful resolution can build a bridge towards
peaceful reunification, which could help considerably in stabilizing the region,
stimulating growth and cooperation, and averting a horrendous cataclysm. If
the thoughts in this Article help move the situation towards greater
understanding and resolution through implementation in even a small way, it
will have fulfilled its primary raison d’etre. If it at least gives more clarity to

264. See, e.g., Drennan, supra note 10, at 165 (documenting U.S. intelligence indicating
North Korea secretly developed nuclear military capabilities in 1989).
265. See KIM ET AL., supra note 71, at 7.
266. Yunling Zhang, Ending Confrontation in the Korean Peninsula: The Way Out,
International Symposium on Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia 145, 151–52 (Jan. 13, 2005)
(on file with author).
267. See Drennan, supra note 10, at 193 (calling the Korean nuclear crisis a “textbook
example of coercive diplomacy”).
268. The conflict between the two Koreas has its own encyclopedia. HOARE & PARES, supra
note 89.
269. For more about how the two Koreas developed during their first thirty years as separate
nations, see JOUNGWON ALEXANDER KIM, DIVIDED KOREA: THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT,
1945–1972 (1975). For a more far-ranging historical perspective, see GILLS, supra note 7.
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the issues involved so that all concerned may see more sharply, then it was not
written in vain. While at best a work in progress as the actual situation
continues to unfold, it aims to provide constructive insight into a very
precarious, real life situation that cries out to be understood and addressed—
rather than ignored.

